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Traveling questions: uncertainty and nonknowledge as vehicles of 
translation in genetic research participation 
 
Klaus Hoeyer (University of Copenhagen) 
 
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that uncertainty and nonknowledge, and not just research results, 
can be important vehicles of translation through which genetic research participation come to 
affect the lives of research participants. Based on interviews with participants in a genetic research 
project, I outline epistemic, emotional, relational and moral implications of research participation. 
Many of them resemble what the literature has described as the social implications of genetic 
counseling, but here they stem from interaction with knowledge-in-the-making or what I simply call 
nonknowledge. While policies aimed at stimulating translation from bench to bedside tend to build 
on the assumption that research only works when knowledge translates into technological ability 
and creates utility, I suggest acknowledging that research has implications long before any clinical 
applications are at hand. Research questions, and not just results, may serve as a generative form 
of knowledge that can travel as fast as any answer.  
 
Keywords: genetics, knowledge, nonknowledge, translation 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Genetic research is enmeshed in politically articulated hopes and expectations of fast translation 
(Brown 2003). Even basic research faces demands for immediate translation into clinical utility and 
economic growth (Hood, Lovejoy and Price 2015), and accordingly research is continuously 
criticized for delivering insufficient or delayed societal impact (Arribas-Ayllon 2010; Levin 2014). 
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The Human Genome Project has been followed by numerous projects aimed at translating genetic 
research into clinical application, and currently a wave of projects on whole genome sequencing 
(WSG) have received significant political and financial support based on the promise of offering 
personalized medicine and altering healthcare as we know it (Hedgecoe 2004; Tutton 2014).
1
 
Research aimed at understanding basic biological mechanisms thus develops in a political landscape 
focused on shortening the distance from “bench to bedside”. The tacit premise seems to be that 
research must generate results (knowledge) that can be translated into technology (ability) and 
thereby create real changes in people‟s lives (utility). In the following, however, I illustrate how 
basic research in and of itself can involve changes for those enrolled as research participants in 
ways that differ significantly from the linear political logic of knowledge-ability-utility. In genetic 
research participation, research questions (nonknowledge) can travel and interact with the doubts 
and concerns of the research participants (their feelings of in-ability) and nevertheless result in very 
real effects (social implications). Indeed, nonknowledge may serve as an important vehicle of 
translation. 
The paper takes point of departure in a basic genetic research project seeking to 
explore the biology of balanced chromosomal rearrangements. To understand how genetic research 
participation influences the research participants, I suggest that we need to understand better the 
social dynamics of research participation. Knowing the these dynamics is important in order to 
design research projects in responsible ways, but it can also be a precondition for evaluating the 
type of data that research participants deliver. Furthermore, some of the dynamics involved in 
genetic research participation can be surprisingly similar to participation in social science research. 
In both forms of research, nonknowledge – research questions – can perform work similar to the 
one usually ascribed to certified answers and research results. I first provide a short introduction to 
discussions about genetic knowledge, nonknowledge and translation of research. Following a 
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description of my methods and the setting in Denmark in which the study was carried out, I then 
provide examples of social implications encountered in the specific genetic research project I 
explored.  
 
GENETIC KNOWLEDGE AND TRANSLATIONAL RESEARCH  
The type of genetic research described in the following involves a search for new aspects of genetic 
influences on health and disease and it depends on both phenotypic and genotypic data. It was once 
a truism that genes (genotype) were unaffected by sociality (Keller 2000), but with the rise of 
epigenetics  the social embeddedness of human biology is becoming more and more widely 
acknowledged and the causal links between phenotype and genotype seen as potentially 
multidirectional (Lock 2005). Lappé and Landecker furthermore argue that we should begin to 
understand not only the “decoding” of genes as socially embedded, but also the very structure of the 
folding of DNA as carrying a socially engrained history (Lappé and Landecker 2015). As we are 
rewriting the relationship between genotype and phenotype, the twin pair of what is believed to be 
'known' and what is 'not known yet but worth knowing' about the causes of health and disease 
continously change. It continues to be contested what counts as valid genetic knowledge depending 
on the subfield of the geneticists (Levin 2014; Timmermans 2015). Genetics as a form of knowing 
is multiple (Mol 2002), and historically (Keller 2000) as well as geographically contingent (Taussig 
2009).  
Nevertheless, the public narrative of genetics is often one of universal truth. In 
Lindee‟s (2015) historical treatment of the rise of genetics as an explanatory device for human 
health and illness, we learn how genetic information has moved from the margins of medicine to the 
very center. Genetics has come to convey authority and become essential to attract funding despite 
its often limited explanatory power in relation to, for example, complex diseases (Ackerman et al. 
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2016; Timmermans 2016). Today, Lindee (2015) suggests, revelation of genetic information 
constitutes “moments of truth” overruling other understandings and explanations. This is certainly 
the case in much of the material presented below, but what actually counts as “genetic knowledge” 
is in many cases not authorized genetic claims, but research questions conveying information about 
what geneticists do not know. It is nonknowledge.  
Research aims at undoing previous “knowledge”, and therefore, the line between 
knowledge and nonknowledge is always under construction. As Gross (2012) remarks, it has long 
been recognized as a feature of science to produce new doubts and new questions: "any growth in 
knowledge can bring about a concomitant growth in what is not known" (2012:425). Drawing on 
Simmel's concept of 'Nichtwissen', Gross suggests seeing nonknowledge as "both inevitable and 
productive" (2012:424) and always part of any knowledge project. Knowledge and nonknowledge 
are each other's reverse sides. There are many other forms of ignorance  (Callon and Rabeharisoa 
2004; Fainzang 2015; Geissler 2013; McGoey 2012; Proctor 2008), but with nonknowledge I mean 
the type of unknown, that researchers seek to convert to known. Nonknowledge presents itself as a 
gap in knowledge, and this gap facilitates action. The space of nonknowledge can be politically 
contested (Böschen et al. 2010), and it is sometimes used strategically to marginalize those that are 
deemed 'ignorant' (Rayner 2012, Vitebsky 1993). In Decoteau and Underman's (2015) studies of the 
trials determining whether vaccines could cause autism, the defendants argued that nonknowledge 
was limited to the genetics of autism, while the parents raising the case wanted researchers to 
acknowledge that also the environmental causes, including vaccines, were unknown and in need of 
investigation. To define nonknowledge was central to the politics of the case.  
 Claims to knowledge are dependent on various forms of tacit knowledge that selects, 
orders, and uses information in light of the interests of the knower (Polanyi 1966). Knowledge does 
not 'know' itself. Furthermore, knowledge claim often carry a moral weight: like accusations of 
The Version of Record has been published in New Genetics and Society, 20XX, http://tandfonline.com  
DOI: 10.1080/14636778.2016.1245134  
5 
 
ignorance, they are never neutral but serve as devices for social ordering (Last 1981, Mair, Kelly 
and High 2012, Vitebsky 1993). If nonknowledge is defined as the reverse side of knowledge, there 
is always a more encompassing form of uncertainty surrounding this struggle of known and 
unknown. Uncertainty as a basic human condition cannot be eradicated (Perron and Rudge 
2016:29ff; Whyte 1997), and the dialectic between knowledge and nonknowledge is just one 
particular approach to dealing with the boundless sea of the unknown.  
From the perspective of the carrier of a genetic disposition the distinction between 
knowledge and nonknowledge can be even more blurred than for the geneticists, but even more 
importantly, the carrier faces uncertainty along multiple dimensions. Ever since Evans-Pritchard's 
(1976) classic study of Azande witchcraft from 1937, medical anthropologists have stayed attuned 
to the way in which people fill the space of uncertainty with faith and socially engrained 
convictions. As noted by Whyte, it can be a matter of pursuing meaning rather than explanation 
(Whyte 1997). Not only is it impossible to fully eradicate uncertainty; it can be more meaningful for 
the individual to opt for the “potentiality” it involves and use the leverage it creates (Taussig, 
Hoeyer and Helmreich 2013).  
 If policymakers tend to focus on knowledge-making as a process of acquiring 
knowledge to generate utility, we still need a better understanding of the actual modes of translating 
research into social change beyond the knowledge-ability-utility nexus. Genetic research has been 
shown to affect many important areas of public life including negotiations of legal entitlements 
(Kowal, Radin and Reardon 2013), the formation of social groupings and international relations 
(Reardon 2005), national identities (Tupasela, Snell and Cañada 2015), and social groupings based 
on genetic traits (Gibbon and Novas 2007). Furthermore, genetic research can influence 
understandings of disease and have looping effects on identity without necessarily offering actual 
treatment opportunities (Eyal et al. 2014). Many such changes relate to macro-level 
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reconfigurations of relations, conceptions and categorizations. In the following, I focus on the 
micro-level changes playing out among the research participants as a consequence of their 
participation in genetic biobank research. Interestingly we find that many of these changes resemble 
what have been found in relation to genetic counselling (Arribas-Ayllon, Featherstone and Atkinson 
2011; Arribas-Ayllon, Sarangi and Clarke 2008; Hallowell 1999; Huniche 2002; Mozersky 2012; 
Svendsen 2006), though here unfolding on the basis of research questions, i.e. genetic 
nonknowledge, rather than authorized genetic knowledge. 
Genetic research participation is an activity full of uncertainties and knowledge gaps 
(Skolbekken et al. 2005) as well as moral ambivalence (Kerr, Cunningham-Burley and Tutton 
2007). If, indeed, these gaps and ambivalences provide room for agency, how do participants use 
these opportunities? If we view research participants as active participants, and not as passive 
donors, as Tutton (2007) among others suggest, what is it that people actually do in the space of 
uncertainty created as they encounter the nonknowledge of a research project, and what are the 
social implications?  
 
METHODS AND SETTING 
In a prominent genetic research lab in Denmark, a group of researchers is investigating the 
biological function of genes. The lab used to be part of a diagnostic unit also providing genetic 
counseling, but today it serves as a research laboratory. For this paper I followed a project in which 
the lab explores the implications of balanced chromosomal rearrangements (where all elements of 
the chromosome are intact but appear in an unusual order, see also Hoeyer, Tupasela and 
Rasmussen, forthcoming). Such rearrangements are supposed to cause no problems for the carrier, 
but they do imply an increased risk of new (unbalanced) rearrangements in potential offspring, 
which tend to cause disabilities. This implies that several of the carriers of balanced rearrangements 
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have learned about their condition in conjunction with parenting a disabled child. The research staff 
continuously stresses how research cannot be separated from genetic counseling, diagnostics and 
care (see also Lappé 2014). It all revolves around the making of new knowledge. In practice, as we 
shall see, they also provide elements of counseling to research participants who pose questions in 
the course of their research participation.  
To identify research participants for the project on balanced chromosomal 
rearrangements, the lab uses a public register in which the results of genetic tests carried out 
anywhere in Denmark are recorded. Danish registers employ a system with a personal identity 
number for each individual, were the name and address are recorded and updated in a base register, 
and all other registers use the same number (Hoeyer 2016). In this way, it is possible to acquire 
contact details for people who have had tests done more than 20 years ago. It is possible to track all 
who have undergone testing because Denmark has a publically funded healthcare system with 
universal access. The genetic register in question was established partly to avoid repeating the same 
tests several times, but it was quickly seen that it could facilitate also research (Videbech and 
Nielsen 1979). Before inviting carriers to participate in research, the researchers contact the local 
clinics where the tests were done to make sure that the persons in question were informed about the 
results. The researchers are very careful never to introduce information about genetic heritage that 
people do not already possess and might not wish to acquire. In some instances, the local clinics 
prefer to contact the individuals, in other cases the lab contacts the potential research participants 
directly. If the participants agree, they are invited to fill in an extensive questionnaire on everything 
from musical aptitude to hearing impairment and psychiatric symptoms. At some level, the 
questions reflect ideas circulating among researchers about potential implications of a balanced 
chromosomal rearrangement. These ideas are tested with the questionnaire exactly because they 
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have not been proven. In some cases, but not all, the respondents are invited to donate a blood 
sample.   
In the questionnaire used by the lab in its 2013 round of recruitment, respondents 
could also indicate whether they were willing to participate also in my project aimed at exploring 
their experience of being involved with genetic research participation. The majority agreed. For 
data protection reasons, I could not access the data files, and I therefore asked the genetic 
researchers to select respondents for me with broad variation according to age, gender, and other 
characteristics that they as researchers had found important, including ethnicity, educational and 
socio-economic level as well as the reactions they had had from the participants. Some participants 
had been positive, some concerned, some found it exciting, some dull.
2
 During the autumn of 2014, 
I continued recruiting participants until I reached a point of saturation. The respondents are listed 
under pseudonyms in Table 1 organized according to gender and age.  
My questions were aimed at exploring their experiences with research participation 
and the hopes and concerns they attached to the genetic research endeavor and the extent to which 
the governance of research addresses them. I asked questions such as: “How did you get involved 
with this research project?”, “Have you subsequently thought about your samples and what they 
have been used for?” “Was there anything you needed to know before agreeing to participate?”, 
“Was there anything special you hoped to gain from your participation?”, “Can you think of 
anything that you would not accept they did with your health data and materials?” These questions 
stimulated a wide range of thoughts and reactions among the participants that they had not 
previously engaged – and many respondents commented on this. Gradually, I realized that not only 
my own questions, but also the questions posed by the genetic researchers in the questionnaire had 
social effects.  
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The interviews were originally conducted to understand the hopes and concerns of the 
research participants and to explore how regulatory landscapes cater for them. I was struck, 
however, by the stories people told about how research participation had impacted their lives. I 
therefore marked anything that came across as a „change‟ or social implication resulting from 
research participation in a thematic coding of the material (Madden 2010). I then categorized the 
changes into types distinguishing between “epistemic” implications (things that people were 
thinking differently about), “emotional” implications (reactions articulated in a language of 
emotions), “relational” implications (when research participation seemed to change how they relate 
to other people or institutions), and finally “moral” implications (when research participation 
installed moral dilemmas or new forms of valuations). Of course, the categories are just analytical 
distinctions: in practice epistemic implications can induce emotional as well as relational and moral 
reactions. Accordingly, some of the narratives below fell into several categories but are only 
reported once. In the course of analyzing the implications, it became more and more obvious that 
they often reflected action taken on the basis of nonknowledge – the questions posed by researchers 
– rather than authorized genetic knowledge. In a process of what Timmermans and Tavory (2012) 
call “abduction” I thus came to focus on the role of knowledge and nonknowledge in processes of 
translation of research and how this translation relate to people‟s pursuit of meaning.3 I present the 
findings in line with the coding of the material according to types of implication to maintain optimal 
transparency and to illustrate the range of social implications that research sets in motion.  
 
EPISTEMIC AND EMOTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
As noted above, there are somewhat floating boundaries between research, diagnostics and care in 
relation to rare genetic conditions. The implications of research participation are therefore also 
difficult to disentangle and often the participants make little or no distinction between their role as 
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patients and participants. Researchers serve as important sources of information and counseling for 
the respondents when various queries arise. For example, when Anne received the invitation to 
participate in research, she got worried that her chromosomal rearrangement was the direct course 
of autism in her grandchild, but as she contacted the lab, she was quickly consoled. She gained new 
genetic knowledge as a consequence of her research participation and came to subscribe to the same 
type of knowledge as the genetic researchers. Instead of focusing on these cases of aligned 
understandings of knowledge, however, I focus in the following on unaligned knowledge and the 
unanticipated implications of genetic research participation that emerge in the gaps of uncertainty 
and nonknowledge. Several forms of social implications emerge from personal interpretations of 
pieces of information picked up in the course of the research participation.  
The questionnaire that they fill in is a key actor in this process. Many respondents 
mentioned “information” that they had acquired from the questionnaire. But does a questionnaire 
contain “information”? On the one hand, it could be said it contains no “information” and conveys 
no knowledge, but just questions reflecting what we do not know yet. If researchers knew, they 
would not need to include the questions in the questionnaire. On the other hand, questions do reflect 
research hypotheses.  As such the questionnaire comes to convey information about what 
researchers suspect might be relevant. The questionnaire is in this sense a form of “blank figure” 
(Hetherington and Lee 2000). It acts on people by way of its ability to contain and connect multiple 
interpretations. Several people use items from the questionnaire to make sense of the conditions 
they identify in relatives, for example by identifying potential genetic causes of their perceived 
illnesses. Morten did so in relation to his daughter, Olga in relation to her niece, and Jens Ole in 
relation to his mother. Others focused on questions unrelated to disease such as those relating to 
musicality and wondered whether they or their relatives could be particularly gifted as a 
consequence of the chromosomal rearrangement. Nina wondered if a chromosomal rearrangement 
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could imply “that you are, like, super something [laughs], or a super-human who will live to 130”, 
just as Anne-Sophie thought that “it might be that you‟re lucky and you have some form of, what 
should I call it, you‟re a genius, because of [the chromosomal rearrangement]”. When using 
questionnaire questions to interpret themselves and their surroundings, they in effect transform what 
the researchers do not know, but wish to investigate, to sources of understanding and explanation.  
Some of these epistemic implications involve also emotional reactions. See, for 
example, how Mette describes her use of the questionnaire to interpret her brother and mother: 
“When I read all those questions (…) I was left wondering… It was weird with all 
those questions because I could recognize some of that from my brother and mother. I 
did get, somehow, a little worried, because I thought it was weird. Why these 
questions, and why so concentrated? And then this thing that I could see that my 
brother and mother could suffer from some of those things”. 
Mette‟s sense of insight involves also an emotional reaction (“a little worried”). Mette was 
particularly struck by questions indicating what she perceived as “psychiatric disorders” and she 
contacted her mother to learn how she (also a carrier who had been invited to fill in the same 
questionnaire) had responded to those questions: 
“…and I learned that there were some questions she had not answered to the full 
because she felt it got a little too intimate (…). And I remember that I thought, „Can it 
really be connected?‟  And then it‟s not at all what they said when I was a kid [that the 
balanced chromosomal rearrangement was insignificant]”.  
We learn here that the mother did not deliver the data the researchers needed if they were to 
investigate a potential link between her carrier status and a particular psychiatric symptom, because 
she already felt the question touched something too intimate. The interpretation of the questions 
thus precluded getting the answer needed to determine whether the link exists. The researchers have 
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noted that questions about psychiatric symptoms (and about body weight) are left unanswered more 
often than other questions.
4
 If it is not just a matter of stigma and privacy, but of research 
participants seeking to use available resources to make sense of family relations, it shows how we 
as researchers need to understand the social dynamics of the creation of research data to assess the 
validity of the data. We cannot see the social processes of data generation as external to scientific 
substance because data are socially constructed all the way through (Gitelman and Jackson 2013).  
In some cases, emotional reactions unfold in the course of talking to researchers and 
then researchers stand a chance of learning about participant concerns. Kirsten explained how she 
had phoned the lead researcher and in the course of the conversation got the impression that she 
might be at risk of leukemia: 
“Then I thought, oh no, my heart stopped beating, I‟ve only got a couple of years left, 
and then what? But as I spoke to her she actually de-mystified it pretty well”.  
For Kirsten the conversation was in this sense an emotional roller-coaster, and it illustrates the skills 
that researchers must possess to carry out this type of recruitment (Lappé 2014). Christian was 
worried after filling in the questionnaire and also called the lab. In the course of the conversation he 
got the impression that by looking at the potential risks associated with a balanced chromosomal 
rearrangement (not otherwise thought to cause any disease) researchers in effect consider the 
rearrangement a cause of disease: 
“I‟m beginning to understand that something has happened to our understanding of 
disease. Perhaps I am diseased (…) Now, I‟m diseased because of the chromosomal 
rearrangement”.  
He is right, of course, in the sense that the researchers are testing a hypothesis that balanced 
chromosomal reaarangments might have implications, only they do not yet have any proof. For 
Christian the hypotheses conveyed in the form of questionnaire data are interpreted in light of what 
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he articulates as eugenics and a special family history. Before serving in the German military during 
World War Two, some members of his family received papers stating they were of pure-bred Aryan 
race, but now Christian joked that “if Adolf [Hitler] knew about the chromosomal rearrangement” 
Christian would probably find himself –  
“– stuffed into the gas chamber. Now I‟m not so „purebred‟ anymore. I guess you 
understand that I‟m always very concerned when people push the genetic heritage 
button”.  
Like the other research participants, Christian interprets research into chromosomal rearrangements 
from a personal perspective, and it comes to influence his perception of himself as well as his 
understanding of disease. In this way, research participation has unintended epistemic and 
emotional implications. The epistemic and emotional implications can also spill over into relational 
implications understood as instances where the research participants come to rethink how they 
relate to other persons as a consequence of dealing with their chromosomal rearrangement. 
 
RELATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
Genetic research can interact with people‟s sense of family in much the same way as genetic 
diagnostics and counseling: people contemplate relations and they sometimes have to make choices 
concerning who to contact. In such cases it becomes obvious that genetic closeness is not the same 
as social kinship (Arribas-Ayllon et al. 2011; Svendsen 2006). For example, Christian felt he had to 
contact a sister he otherwise avoided, while he had decided not to tell his own daughter that she was 
carrier. The daughter, he explained, should continue to feel healthy and, if an insurance company 
asked, she should be able to say in all honesty “I‟m well”. As a purveyor of sensitive information, 
the research project thus affects the relations between the research participants and their relatives.  
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Often it was in the course of the initial diagnostic phase (when entering the register 
from which they were later recruited) that people had had to think about their “family tree”. Lisbeth 
mentioned that it is annoying how she as a consequence of the genetic register remains “affiliated” 
with a half-brother that she never met. Others, such as Hilma, matter-of-factly contacted genetic 
relatives that they never previously considered contacting. Yet others, like Olga, were sad that, 
during the diagnostic phase, they had to convey information about the chromosomal rearrangement 
and in this way bring something unfortunate to the relationship (which is interesting when it is 
considered that the rearrangement is not supposed to be a cause of disease).  
For some, the consequences are relatively dramatic. Nicklas, for instance, who has a 
psychiatric diagnosis, learned as a consequence of his research participation that his father had 
enrolled both him and his sister in another research project when they were kids. He was furious 
that he had never been told and had now confronted his father. They had had very limited contact 
following the fight, but probably for other reasons too. Else also encountered dramatic changes in 
her family life. When Else had a son with a rare chromosomal disorder, she learned that she had a 
balanced chromosomal rearrangement, and she told her family that everyone was invited to undergo 
genetic testing to determine their own carrier status. Looking back at the ensuing events, Else 
explains: 
“My mother and father live just down the road. One day, my father pops by and tells 
me that he has spoken to this doctor and then adds that…I‟m adopted. That was 
somewhat dramatic [voldsomt]. Afterwards I‟ve been happy that he told me, but right 
there it was a traumatic experience. Especially because my mother wouldn‟t talk about 
it. My father wanted to talk. My mother wouldn‟t talk about it at all!” 
I asked Else why her father decided to tell her about the adoption:  
The Version of Record has been published in New Genetics and Society, 20XX, http://tandfonline.com  
DOI: 10.1080/14636778.2016.1245134  
15 
 
“It was because the doctor wanted a blood sample, and then I think…well, they could 
have decided not to tell, or just tell the doctor, but, but, but I could feel how my father 
wanted me to know (…) And I really appreciate it. In the end, I came to appreciate it.” 
Note how the search for genetic explanations (primarily for research reasons as the grandparents 
were not in need of reproductive counseling) come to serve as reason for telling about an adoption 
that had otherwise been kept secret. It had significant relational implications. It delivered what 
Strathern calls “constitutive knowledge” about kinship – knowledge that is formative for relations 
(Strathern 1999, 68). In fact, Else had long suspected something: 
“I was no more than 10-11 years old and I sat playing by the piano when I overheard 
my mother talking with her sister on the phone, and there was some kind of problem 
with my aunt‟s son, and my mother apparently says something to my aunt and she 
replies, „How would you know when you haven‟t given birth to a child‟. My mother 
repeats that sentence to my father, while I‟m sitting there playing next door.” 
Else had confronted her mother with what she heard several times, also as a teenager, but the 
mother always denied any talk about adoption. In contrast, Else says of her father: 
“For him it was important to tell, so that it wouldn‟t come from the doctor. I shouldn‟t 
be told by a doctor. It should come from him.” 
Else thus simultaneously interprets it as a desire to tell and a fear of it being revealed by somebody 
else. Of course, the doctors would never reveal an adoption. The revelation of the adoption happens 
through a route of personal interpretations and desires using the gaps of uncertainty to create room 
for agency. For Else, the chromosomal rearrangement furthermore becomes as a reason to contact 
her biological family: 
“I was very interested in finding out – it was primarily this I wanted to know: Does 
anybody in that family have the same gene error?” 
The Version of Record has been published in New Genetics and Society, 20XX, http://tandfonline.com  
DOI: 10.1080/14636778.2016.1245134  
16 
 
Through the biological mother Else learned she had a sister. And so she asked her mother about the 
chromosomal rearrangement:  
“I asked her. It was one of the most important things for me, though I also wanted to 
meet her, just as I‟d like to meet my sister. But I didn‟t do it to become part of the 
family, that family, „cause it‟d be really strange for me. I really don‟t need that.”  
The biological mother did not think they had the rearrangement, and it turned out that she wanted to 
limit the contact and avoid introducing Else to her sister. Considering the fact that the chromosomal 
rearrangement is not related to any known disease – linkage is only a research hypothesis – it is 
remarkable that the search for “genetic truth” (Lindee 2015) can overrule first the adoptee mother‟s 
wish to conceal the adoption and then serve as explanation when justifying the interest in contacting 
the genetic relatives. Genetic nonknowledge can do much the same work as established genetic 
knowledge.
5
  
 
MORAL IMPLICATIONS 
When research participation interacts with relations between people it easily spills over into moral 
anxieties relating to responsibility and questions about what is right and wrong, good and bad. 
Previous studies have shown how genetics can involve “a moral imperative attributed to clients or 
patients – a responsibility to disclose information to other family members who may be genetically 
at risk” (Arribas-Ayllon, Featherstone, and Atkinson 2011, 6). Often the sense of genetic 
responsibility is gendered so that women in particular are expected to care for other relatives 
(Hallowell 1999). Research participation stimulates some of the same social dynamics because it 
makes the participants contemplate relations, as we saw above, and thereby also what they owe to 
whom. We already saw above how Christian, Hilma, Lisbeth and Olga contemplated their 
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responsibilities. Olga furthermore explains that following the invitation to participate in research, 
she informed her children about their carrier status: 
“I did not dare not telling them. I didn‟t want to be the reason [skyld] they would get a 
child with Down‟s Syndrome.” 
Again it is Olga that makes this interpretation – that she could be the “reason” and that the 
chromosomal rearrangement would cause Down‟s Syndrome. Personal interpretations of genetics 
form the basis of decisions and are used to direct blame irrespective of what researchers would see 
as genetically relevant (Arribas-Ayllon et al. 2008; Mozersky 2012). It is worth noting also that the 
Danish word that Olga uses, which I translated as “reason” [skyld], is also the word used for “guilt” 
and “blame”. Hence, she is also saying she does not want to be guilty. Similarly, Sonja writes in an 
email correspondence that she wants to know more about the risks her daughters will face because:  
“I want to be able to help/inform them so that they won‟t have children with a genetic 
handicap. Would feel guilty [skyld] if I didn‟t tell them about things that could have 
been avoided.” 
For some, research participation involves blaming or belittling themselves. Several of the people I 
interviewed had forgotten about the balanced chromosomal rearrangement until they received the 
invitation to participate in research, but now they referred to it as a flaw or error characterizing 
them. Half of the respondents use terms like “gene error”, “DNA disorder”, “chromosome error” 
and so on, though a balanced chromosomal rearrangement is not a disease. Hilma, for example, who 
has had no indication of any problems and who had forgotten about the old tests, now referred to it 
as “the damned chromosome defect”. Here again it is as if “genetic truth” overrules 
phenomenological experience (Lindee 2015), but it remains personal versions of “genetic truth”. In 
one case, however, Patrick specifically states that he still “feels normal” and therefore does not fear 
the results of the research.  
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Anette is more ambivalent. The invitation to participate in research has made her 
contemplate a disablement that she has had throughout her life (which, she has otherwise been told, 
is unrelated to the balanced rearrangement). She states that she feels “guilty”, and when I ask why, 
she explains: “I just know that it is not always as healthy as it ought to be… my diet. I probably 
ought to eat more organic food, if that is wholesome…” We might characterize her remark as a 
“misunderstanding” (see discussion in Arribas-Ayllon et al. 2008), but perhaps we should focus 
instead on how Anette makes sense of her situation using nonknowledge to maneuver uncertainty. 
Like the Azande she is looking for meaning, an orientation in the world when faced with misfortune 
(Whyte 1997). She hopes that the researchers can figure out whether her genes have changed since 
the original samples were taken in 1971. Trying to understand why she has this curiosity, I ask 
whether she feels different, and she replies: “No I haven‟t thought about that.” She is quiet for a 
while and then continues: “You can‟t treat the chromosomes. You can‟t. It‟s just the way it is”. In 
this way, research participation makes her go through phases of both moral guilt and consolation 
and, importantly, it happens in the course of participating in both the genetic research project and 
the interview with me. Both types of research serve as occasions for negotiating blame and 
attributing meaning to her misery. The unknown cause of disease – the nonknowledge – creates a 
moral space of full of hope and concern, consolation and blame. In conclusion, Anette says that she 
hopes genetic research will prove she is not to blame for her impairment.  
Some respondents held personal hypotheses that they hoped research would prove 
right. Nicklas (who was diagnosed as with a psychiatric disorder) wondered whether genetic 
difference could be an advantage rather than a risk, much in line with the optimism uttered by Nina 
and Anne-Sophie above. Nicklas hoped research would establish his disorder as an advanced 
evolutionary step where the brain has reached a higher level of consciousness. He felt quite certain 
that the voices he heard were real and his hypothesis was that when others could not hear them, it 
The Version of Record has been published in New Genetics and Society, 20XX, http://tandfonline.com  
DOI: 10.1080/14636778.2016.1245134  
19 
 
was because of lower levels of brain activity in ordinary people. He hoped the genetic research he 
participated in could promote a better understanding of brain biology, but he also wanted to stay 
realistic and not expect too much of the researchers. Nicklas‟ personal theory has interesting 
resemblances to the current wave of interest in so-called neuro-diversity in the USA following the 
publication of Silberman‟s book about autism as a labor market resource (Silberman 2015). 
Silberman‟s point is that autism is a difference, not a pathology, and that we should embrace it for 
its strengths rather than seeking its cure. For Nicklas the aspirations can build on that which is not 
known yet, on nonknowledge.  
Henriette also had a personal hypothesis, but she was less optimistic. She suffered 
from Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and regarded the fact that researchers 
wanted to research her genes as indication that it had a genetic cause. She intensely wanted that 
hypothesis to be confirmed so that the world would know that her disorder was “real”: “I keep 
hoping that they, at some point, will prove that ADHD exists, that it is real”. Lindee‟s notion of 
genetics as a particular purveyor of truth here again interacts with notions of confirmation, guilt and 
consolation. The researchers sometimes learn about some of these hopes and aspirations among the 
participants, and discussing them then becomes an important part of the recruitment process. It is, 
however, a task that remains unfunded. It is tacit work. And though private hopes and concerns 
potentially influence how people respond to the questionnaire, as we saw above, there is limited 
room for letting such narratives influence the scientific presentation and interpretation of the data.  
Finally, it is worth noting that people through their participation, and in the course of 
the interview with me, evaluate the value of research as such from a moral perspective. Research is 
for almost all respondents associated with a sense of hope. In most cases, the hope remains abstract 
(and not as clearly defined as for Anette, Nicklas and Henriette), which probably reflects that the 
participants are healthy volunteers. However, there are also elements of doubt and moral 
The Version of Record has been published in New Genetics and Society, 20XX, http://tandfonline.com  
DOI: 10.1080/14636778.2016.1245134  
20 
 
ambivalence (see also Kerr, Cunningham-Burley, and Tutton 2007). As Christian stated so clearly 
above, genetic research can stimulate reflections on “eugenics” (a term with many connotations and 
historically contingent meanings, Koch 2004; Koch 2006). Most respondents commented on 
eugenic effects when they noted how new genetic knowledge could stimulate more abortions. To 
understand the respondents‟ thoughts about abortion, it is important to realize that Denmark is a 
highly secular country (Bondesen 2003; Zuckerman 2008) and that abortion is not a politically 
contested topic in the same sense as in the USA (Albæk, Green-Pedersen and Larsen 2014). There 
are no political parties in parliament opposing abortion, and access to abortion is one of the few 
guaranteed rights of treatment in health law (Hartlev 2005).  
Two of my respondents who themselves had disabled children stated that the prospect 
of better prenatal screening was a major motivation for them to participate in research. They loved 
their children, but they would not like others to experience the trouble they had gone through, nor 
for anyone to have a child that demanded their care but which might outlive them. Kirsten, in 
contrast, had had several miscarriages before she adopted three children, and she was fiercely 
against abortion. For her the thought of contributing to new prenatal screening options was 
disconcerting. Mostly, however, new forms of prenatal screening that might facilitate abortion 
remained an unresolved moral puzzle. Maria wanted to get the tools to avoid a heavily impaired 
child, but continued:  
“The only thing that restrains me from saying that I only want a healthy child is that I 
couldn‟t bear having to kill a child, ‟cause that‟s what you do when you get an 
abortion, right? (…) I guess that at some point we won‟t have anybody left with a 
disablement, they will have been deselected, and I don‟t know whether that‟s good or 
bad.” 
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Research participation in this way stimulates thoughts about the moral ambiguity of societal 
developments. It is important to remember that genetic research has both identified reasons for 
abortions and removed uncertainties that used to give rise to abortion. Hence, genetic knowledge 
can both increase and decrease abortion rates. Both Nina and Nicklas make a point of not opposing 
abortion but on the other hand not wanting research to remove everything “different” or “difficult”. 
Anne-Sophie wondered if too much was done to promote abortion:  
“When I think about how little, how few [people] with Down‟s you see anywhere in 
public spaces today. There aren‟t many left. When I was a kid, they were part of 
everyday life.”  
Research participation therefore interacts with hopes for a better future, but simultaneously makes 
the participants contemplate their doubts about what counts as “better”. Nonknowledge – that which 
we do not know yet – is central to accommodating the diverse interests and moral positions of the 
participants.  
In short, research operates in a moral landscape of guilt, blame and consolation – not 
as a result of choices made by researchers, but because research participants bring their own 
agendas into the projects. The agendas develop in the space for agency that nonknowledge and 
uncertainty produce.  
 
CONCLUSIONS  
Policies focusing on translation from bench to bedside tend to build on the assumption that research 
primarily stimulates change when knowledge translates into technological ability and creates utility. 
This vision essentially reduces science to engineering; knowing to doing (Nowotny and Testa 
2010:5). Here, in contrast, I suggest that research may also translate through patterns of 
nonknowledge and feelings of in-ability, and still have very real effects. Research can have many 
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implications long before any clinical applications are at hand. These implications are, however, 
somewhat different from those articulated in the politically motivated bench-to-bedside literature. In 
this paper I have presented epistemic, emotional, relational as well as moral implications of research 
participation. They are all enacted before any scientific or technological innovation has 
materialized. Interestingly, many of the social implications resemble what has been found in 
relation to genetic counseling based on authorized genetic knowledge. What this study shows is that 
the social dynamics are very similar irrespective of the form of knowledge: people can use 
nonknowledge – research questions – in much the same way as they engage authorized genetic 
knowledge.  
It remains contested and ambiguous what counts as “knowledge”. If knowledge claims 
are known to serve as “ordering devices”, we should note also how nonknowledge provides 
leverage for social ordering. Konrad (2003) has insightfully shown how genetic knowledge is used 
for social ordering as people employ secrecy and selective knowledge distribution to model kinship 
ties. Here, however, I have focused on nonknowledge, rather than family secrets, and shown how it 
opens gaps for action and facilitate social ordering through that which is not known by any of the 
involved family members. Nonknowledge provides a gap of uncertainty, which is infused with 
personal interpretations. In this gap, agency unfolds. Some might construe the participants as simply 
lacking knowledge, or misunderstanding the research they participate in. However, it is important to 
realize that the researchers running the project I studied do try very hard to communicate what they 
see as relevant and valid knowledge. They can in no way be seen as restrictive in their attempts to 
share their perception of genetic truth. Therefore, we cannot expect “misunderstandings” to go 
away irrespective of the number of educational campaigns.  
Instead of focusing on “misunderstandings” as errors we could experiment more with 
how to engage and tackle people‟s personal interpretations in ways that see them as productive for 
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both researchers and research participants. I do not suggest embracing some type of extreme 
knowledge relativism, because genetic researchers do know more about genetic causation than the 
research participants. However, the interpretations based on nonknowledge are bound to affect the 
research because they shape the information researchers can collect. If funding bodies would 
finance the infrastructures needed for a deeper social engagement between researchers and research 
participants, there could be more opportunities to enter a continuous conversation with the 
participants. One woman decided not to answer truthfully to questions relating to psychiatric 
diagnosis, others hoped to find proof of their own hypotheses, and others still were eager to support 
any study that would prove their chromosomal rearrangement related to some type of superiority. 
This implies that we should do more to engage the agendas and objectives that people bring from 
the bedside to the bench in order to understand both people‟s motivations and the nature of the data 
they deliver. This is, indeed, a question of approaching people as active research participants rather 
than donors or research subjects (Tutton 2007). It remains the case, however, that funding structures 
and journal requirements do little to accommodate the work this involves.  
 Finally, we need to appreciate the parallel between participation in genetic research 
and participation in the type of social science research that this paper represents. Throughout my 
study, I have had to realize that my questions – just like the questions in the questionnaire of the 
genetic study – interacted with the informants‟ hopes and concerns, and stimulated reactions. It 
might be minor effects, and yet it illustrates how translations take place in every interaction where 
research plans meet research participants. Perhaps we should think of the studies themselves, and 
the questions they raise, as agents of change in their own right. Perhaps our questions are as 
important as the results we seek to communicate. Questions represent a generative form of 
knowledge. They travel through the thoughts they stimulate. They are blank figures, forms of 
nonknowledge shaped by other knowledge projects, and in this form they work on people. We 
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could do more to acknowledge social science research questions as scientific outputs. Perhaps, 
social scientists should also experiment more with studying what questions – as carriers of 
nonknowledge – produce. Could greater acknowledgement of the work done by traveling questions 
perhaps provide new political spaces different from those of the bench-to-bedside paradigm where 
impact is supposed to be linear and value should relate to the plan of the funding agency rather than 
that of the research participant? When addressing such issues, policymakers and researchers alike 
will have to think more actively of research projects (and not research results) as important agents 
of translation. Questions can sometimes travel as fast as answers. 
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Notes 
                                                          
1
 Consider, e.g., the national Institute of Health program on genetic screening in the USA, the 100K 
project on WGS in the UK, the similar plans in Iceland and on the Faroe Islands, or the plans by the 
authorities in Norway and Denmark to initiate such large-scale infrastructure projects. See also the 
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Bench to Bedside program initiated by the National Institutes of Health 
(http://clinicalcenter.nih.gov/ccc/btb/). 
2
 In 2014, I was provided with a list of respondents with contact details, age and gender, and no 
further information. I did not know who matched which of the additional selection criteria focusing 
on noted differences in reactions to participation. The selected respondents were invited by letter to 
participate in an interview and informed that it could be in a place of their own choice or, if they 
preferred, by phone or as a written response to a set of questions. Two persons did not wish to 
participate after all, and the rest agreed. Interviews were conducted from Agust 2014 and six 
months forward, and followed up with more work with the scientists to understand the project 
properly. The interviews typically lasted around one hour, but one was just 15 minutes and the 
longest almost three hours. Some interviews had follow-up interviews on the phone, or emails 
adding further reflections or comments. They were all conducted in Danish and transcribed 
verbatim. I have translated the quotes. In a few instances, where people were particularly worried 
about confidentiality, I have changed the gender or insignificant details relating to a disease to make 
the family narrative less recognizable. 
3
 The emphasis in the following is on social change and human actors are the focus of the analysis 
both as agents and objects of change. Non-human agents and other types of implications could have 
been highlighted. For example, register and record-keeping formats exert forms of agency that this 
type of analysis does little to elucidate, and similarly the storage of samples and data involves a 
range of implications I do not seek to cover (see Kowal and Radin 2015).  
4
 It is well-known also among questionnaire developers that people are selective in what they report 
in a questionnaire depending on what they assume relevant for the researchers: local interpretations 
precondition the data that can be acquired and patients and health professionals can use the same 
questionnaire with significant variation (Groenvold et al. 1997).  
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5
 Some readers might object that these are narratives about diagnostics rather than research 
participation. However, it is important to remember that research often leads to diagnostic 
information and vice versa. In the course of the diagnostic process, some relatives are contacted to 
provide a complete family history as much for research reasons as to undergo diagnostics or receive 
care and the genetic register is partly construed with research in mind.  
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